Up until the spring of 2020, a FIDIC 1999 Sub-Clause 13.7 [Adjustments for Changes in Legislation] claim was just one of many issues to be resolved, for example, in a delay and disruption claim or a Cost claim. However, the focus it receives in the context of Covid-19 is drastically different. Many in the industry are using the changes in legislation provision to seek financial compensation in a situation that would otherwise potentially only attract an extension of time. Awarding Cost for Covid-19 events regardless of the circumstances may seem to some (Contractors mostly, though there are Employers and Engineers who agree) like the appropriate thing to do, but whether it is correct according to the Contract is a different question.
In March 2019, in the English Court of Appeal, Sir
Page Corrigenda 146 For provisions referring to sub-clause 3.7, see
The last year or two has seen changes in arbitration rules and procedures, caused in no small part by the COVID-19 pandemic. There are new LCIA, DIFC-LCIA and ICC arbitration rules. The Seoul Protocol on Video Conferencing in International Arbitration is being regularly used and the Africa Arbitration Academy Protocol on Virtual Hearings has been issued. There have also been revisions to the IBA Rules on Taking Evidence in International Arbitration. This short update looks at the key take-aways from these changes.
A contract may require a party giving notice of a claim to specify the contractual or legal basis of that claim in the notice (or the supporting particulars). What if that party states a contractual or legal basis for the claim but later (perhaps with the benefit of additional information or because of advice from its lawyers) changes its mind or wants to include further contractual or legal bases? This was considered by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Maeda Corporation and China State Construction Engineering (Hong Kong) Limited v Bauer Hong Kong Limited  HKCA 830. It found that a subcontractor could not change the contractual basis for its claim once the time period for providing such notice had expired. What, if any, impact will this decision have on the FIDIC forms of contract?
Airports Authority of Trinidad and Tobago v Jusamco Pavers Ltd
An issue that often arises in international arbitrations involving the FIDIC forms of contract is whether a claimant's failure to: (a) go through the dispute resolution provisions; or (b) comply with a time-bar clause gives rise to a question of admissibility or jurisdiction. Put another way, if a claimant has failed to issue a notice of claim within 28 days or failed to refer a dispute to a DAB, does the arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction to make an award on the merits or should the arbitral tribunal make an award stating that it lacks jurisdiction?
Covid-19 has had huge consequences around the world and unfortunately
Triple Point Technology, Inc v PTT Public Company Ltd 
FIDIC is concerned about its image. It says that heavily amending the FIDIC forms of contract impacts upon the FIDIC brand and that this is damaging FIDIC’s reputation. It seeks to address this with the introduction of five Golden Principles. But the Golden Principles are merely aspirational; they are not binding and have no contractual effect. Does this render them a pointless gesture ‘trying to hold back the tide’?
The recent English case Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Europe Limited v Euler Hermes Europe SA (NV)  EWHC 2250 (Comm) highlights that where an on demand bond is assigned and a demand then made under that bond, the beneficiary will need to be sure not only that the demand is compliant with the terms of the bond but also that the assignment was effective in the first place.
It has been suggested that FIDIC’s new Emerald Book may be “a contractors’ charter for riches”. 1 This article examines whether this new form of contract for underground works by FIDIC and the International Tunnelling and Underground Space Association is too contractor-biased or whether it provides a sensible and pragmatic risk allocation process, in an area of construction and engineering which is well known for claims. If more risks are placed on the Employer in this form of contract, what are the benefits of the contract compared to, for example, an unamended FIDIC Yellow Book?
Will an oral agreement override a written one that expressly prohibits oral modification? No. The UK Supreme Court in Rock Advertising Ltd - v - MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd brings welcome clarification to the English common law on “no oral modification” (NOM) clauses. The courts will now uphold them.
Contract clauses that deny a contractor entitlement to an extension of time for concurrent delays caused by both employer and contractor are valid in principle. In North Midland Building Ltd -V- Cyden Homes Ltd  the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has ruled that such clauses do not offend the common law prevention principle. Nor do they give rise to an implied term to prohibit the imposition of delay damages that may result.
In all construction contracts, one of the central principles is the Employer’s obligation to pay the contract price. The Contractor will be wary about the Employer’s financial standing and ability to pay and concerned to ensure that payments are made on time and that effective remedies are available in case of late or non-payment. The FIDIC standard forms of contract contain provisions dealing with these aspects.
This article considers what the arbitration landscape will look like when (or perhaps if!) the UK leaves the EU and concludes that big changes are unlikely.
Clause 8 contains all the fundamental provisions relating to the start of the Works, the Time for Completion, delays and the entitlement of the Contractor to an extension of time and of the Employer to delay damages, and finally the circumstances in which a suspension of the Works can occur and the implications for the Parties.
MT Højgaard AS v E.ON Climate and Renewables UK Robin Rigg East Ltd & Anor is an important English case because it considered a fitness for purpose obligation in a design and build contract. In FIDIC’s Yellow Book contracts (1999 and 2017) there are also fitness for purpose obligations. This article examines the Supreme Court’s analysis of a fitness for purpose obligation in the Højgaard case and whether it would be applied to FIDIC’s Yellow Book contracts.
Much has already been written concerning the new FIDIC forms of contract published in December 2017. They are approximately 50 % longer and sought to set out the various procedure in much greater detail with the object of both encouraging good practice and reducing the scope for disputes. Numerous minor amendments have also been made. The purpose of this article is to look in more detail at the provisions dealing with Variations, these being amongst the most frequently scrutinised in practice.
FIDIC’s 2017 editions introduced a new Claims management system in clause 20 that channels Claims through two very different procedures. One of them is very simple and involves almost no risk whereas the other will require investment of significant project resources, will take the parties a considerable amount of time to resolve and carries fatal consequences if not followed properly. It has therefore become a priority for anyone handling this Claims management system to understand how clause 20.1 sorts the different types of Claims and to recognise that the classification scheme is not as straightforward as the wording of the Contract suggests, as explored in this article.