FIDIC 1999 Books – Commentary on Clause 12
FIDIC 1999 is a re-measurement contract so that the Employer takes the risk of variations to the quantities and, in certain cases, to the rates and prices which may be applied for the work executed. If the Employer wishes to employ a Contractor on a lump-sum or cost plus basis then this clause needs to be deleted. Sub-Clause 12.1 deals with the measurement of the works. Sub-Clause 12.2 does not include a reference to any standard method of measurement but states that the works are to be measured in accordance with the Bill of Quantities or other applicable Schedules. The lack of reference to a particular standard method of measurement has been criticised. Sub-Clause 12.3 deals with evaluating the appropriate rate or price for the works. There are three methods of evaluating the works:- a) The rate or price specified for such item in the Contract; but if there is no such item b) The rate or price specified for similar work. c) However, in certain specified circumstances, a new rate or price shall be appropriate. Sub-Clause 12.4 deals with the valuation of omissions from the Work. As this is a re-measurement contract there is no warranty that the quantities measured in the Bill of Quantities are accurate. Nael Bunni suggests that when quantities within the Bill of Quantities are exceeded then payment should be at the rates set out in the Bill. There have been some cases where the courts have adopted differing approaches; however, in those cases the wording of the remeasurement clause differed to that within FIDIC. These decisions have been described by Dr. Bunni as being controversial.
FIDIC 1999 Books – Commentary of Clause 11
Clause 11 requires that the Works shall be in the condition required by the Contract at the end of the Defects Notification Period. Where the Contractor carries out work in the Defects Notification Period, it is not entitled to receive payment if the work was a result of a defect in the design for which the Contractor was responsible. Similarly, if the Plant, Materials or workmanship are not in accordance with the Contract or there is a failure by the Contractor to comply with any other obligation then it is required to remedy the problem without payment. The Employer may obtain an extension of the Defects Notification Period if the Works, a Section or a major piece of Plant cannot be used during the Defects Notification Period. The Contractor is required to remedy any defect during the Defect Notification Period and, if it does not, the Employer may claim against the Contractor. Rights are given to the Contractor to undertake this work subject to the Employer’s reasonable security restrictions. Once the Defects Notification Period has expired the Engineer is required within 28 days, subject to receipt of the Contractor’s Documents and the completion of any tests, to issue a Performance Certificate. It is the Performance Certificate that is deemed to constitute acceptance of the Works. Sub-Clause 11.10 provides that after the Performance Certificate has been issued, each Party will remain liable for the fulfilment of any obligation which remains unperformed at the time. The extent and meaning of this clause is open to debate.
The Courtesy Trap – FIDIC’s Sub-Clause 20.5 – Amicable Settlement and Emirates Trading
In this article Corbett & Co. Director Andrew Tweeddale addresses whether sub-clause 20.5 is a condition precedent to the commencement of an arbitration or whether it is an obligation, the breach of which will not affect the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to resolve the dispute.
FIDIC 1999 Books – Commentary on Clause 10
Clause 10 deals with the Taking-Over of the Works, Sections, or parts of the Works. Sub-Clause 10.1 deals with the Taking-Over of the Works and Sections. Taking-Over by the Employer happens when the Works (a) pass the Tests on Completion; (b) are substantially complete; (c) any contractual requirements relating to Taking-Over have been met; and (d) the Taking-Over Certificate has been issued or is deemed to have been issued. Sub-Clauses 10.2 and 10.3 deal with deemed Taking-Over where the Employer uses part of the Works or interferes with the Tests on Completion for more than 14 days. The failure to issue a Taking-Over Certificate by the Engineer, where the Employer has taken into commercial use the Works, will amount to a breach of contract.
FIDIC 1999 Books – Commentary on Clause 9
Clause 9 deals with the Tests on Completion. Sub-Clause 9.1 requires the Contractor to give notice when it is ready to carry out the Tests on Completion. Tests on Completion are a defined term at Sub-Clause 1.1.3.4. Sub-Clause 9.2 deals with delayed testing caused by either the Employer or the Contractor. Sub-Clause 9.3 deals with retesting after a failure to pass the Tests on Completion. Sub-Clause 9.4 deals with a failure to meet the requirements of the contract after retesting.
FIDIC 1999 Books – Commentary on Clause 5
Clause 5 defines a ‘nominated Subcontractor’ as either a Subcontractor who is stated in the Contract as being ‘nominated’; or who the Engineer instructs the Contractor to employ as a Subcontractor under clause 13. The Contractor may object to employing a nominated Subcontractor. A number of grounds are deemed to be reasonable for objecting and these include: where there are reasons to believe that the Subcontractor does not have sufficient resources, competence or financial strength to complete the subcontracted works; where the Subcontractor refuses to agree to indemnify the Contractor for any negligence; or where the Subcontractor does not agree to carry out the works so as not to put the Contractor in breach of its own obligations. If the Employer requires that the Contractor employ a nominated Subcontractor where a reasonable objection has been made then it must agree to indemnify the Contractor. The Contractor is required to pay to the nominated Subcontractor the amounts which the Engineer certifies to be due in accordance with the Subcontract. This sum is then added to the Contract Price as well as any amount for overheads and profit as stated in the appropriate schedule or Appendix to Tender. However, before issuing a Payment Certificate to the Contractor the Engineer may ask for evidence that previous payments have been made to the nominated Subcontractor. If evidence is not provided by the Contractor or the Contractor does not satisfy the Engineer that there are grounds for withholding payment then the Employer may at his discretion pay the nominated Subcontractor directly.
FIDIC 1999 Books – Commentary on Clause 2
Corbett & Co. has devised a helpful commentary on FIDIC 1999 books Clause 2. Clause 2 sets out certain obligations which are imposed on the Employer; however, this is by no means all the Employer’s obligations. The obligation to pay the Contractor, for example, is found in Sub-Clause 14.7 and the obligation to Take-Over the Works is found at Sub-Clause 10.1. The first obligation imposed on the Employer under this Clause is to give to the Contractor a right of access. Sub-Clause 2.1 needs to be read alongside Sub-Clauses 2.3 and 4.6, which make it clear that possession of the Site need not be exclusive. Sub-Clause 2.2 imposes on the Employer an obligation to assist the Contractor when requested to obtain permits, licences or approvals required by the laws of the Country. The obligation to reasonably assist is not an absolute obligation and generally will not mean the Employer will have to expend money on fulfilling the obligation. Sub-Clause 2.3 imposes on the Employer an obligation similar to that imposed on the Contractor under Sub-Clause 4.6. The Employer is responsible for any failure by its personnel to co-operate with the Contractor or to comply with safety regulations, take care of persons on Site, make sure the Site is reasonably free from unnecessary obstructions, and protect the environment. Sub-Clause 2.4 imposes on the Employer an obligation to show that financial arrangements have been made and are in place to enable it to pay the Contract Price. Sub-Clause 2.5 deals with the Employer’s Claims and requires that the Employer give notice and particulars of its claim before the Engineer makes a Determination under Sub-Clause 3.5. The Employer cannot set-off any claims it may have against the Contractor unless it complies with this Sub-Clause.
FIDIC 1999 Books – Commentary on Clause 1
Clause 1 sets out many of the boilerplate clauses within the Contract and provides a number of definitions which are used thereafter. The Clause has been substantially changed from the Red Book 4th edn with a raft of new clauses added. Sub-Clause 1.3 deals with communications and states that approvals, certificates, consents and determinations shall not be unreasonable withheld or delayed. The assignment provisions in Sub-Clause 1.7 have now changed so that restriction on assignment applies to both the Contractor and Employer. Delayed Drawings and Instructions is dealt with at Sub-Clause 1.9. This was previously dealt with at Clause 6.4 of the Red Book 4th edn and it is unclear why such an important provision has now been rolled up in the General Provisions clause.
FIDIC’s Sub-Clause 20.5 – A Condition Precedent to Arbitration
The 1999 FIDIC forms of contract contain a number of obligations and/or conditions precedent that require (a) a party to give notice of a claim (Sub-Clauses 20.1 and 2.5); (b) refer the claim to the Engineer (Sub-Clauses 20.1 and 3.5); and (c) submit the dispute to a Dispute Adjudication Board (“DAB”) (Sub-Clause 20.4). If either party gives a notice of dissatisfaction relating to the DAB’s Decision then Sub-Clause 20.5 provides that: “Where notice of dissatisfaction has been given under Sub-Clause 20.4 above, both Parties shall attempt to settle the dispute amicably before the commencement of arbitration. However, unless both Parties agree otherwise, arbitration may be commenced on or after the fifty-sixth day after the day on which notice of dissatisfaction was given, even if no attempt at amicable settlement has been made.”
Release from Performance – FIDIC’s Clause 19.7 and Other Remedies
Is not uncommon to find that an employer attempts to pass almost all risk in a contract to the contractor. However, such an approach may have unforeseen consequences when events later make completion of the works impossible. Here Andrew Tweeddale considers how and when a contractor might be released from further performance.
Cutting the Gordian Knot: Enforcing Awards where an Application has been made to set aside the award at the seat of arbitration
One of the grounds where a New York Convention award may be refused recognition and enforcement is where the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. A similar provision exists in the English Arbitration Act 1996 s.103(2)(f). Under both the New York Convention and the Arbitration Act 1996 the word “may” is used which indicates that even if the award has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration it might still be enforced in another country. This article focuses on recent developments under English law as to how the courts have dealt with the enforcement of annulled awards. We also examine the Arbitration Act 1996 s.103(5) which provides that where an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to the relevant court, the court before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the recognition or enforcement of the award. In countries which have adopted modern arbitration laws there is an almost universally held pro-enforcement attitude when considering international arbitration awards. However, when an award is challenged, or has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration, the enforcing courts may have to consider the status of the award. One view is that an award that has been set aside at the seat has no legal status and therefore there is nothing to enforce. An opposing view is that the annulment of the award at the seat of the arbitration does not affect its validity. The English courts have, however, approached the question in a pragmatic way. They have rejected an approach based on legal theory and simply applied a test as to when an award, which has been set aside, should or should not be enforced.
The Problem with Enforcing Arbitration Awards that have been Annulled
The purpose of the 1958 New York Convention is to facilitate so far as possible the international recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Nevertheless it provides that a court may refuse to do that if such an award has already been set aside or suspended at its seat. The English courts have interpreted this word ‘may’ as giving themselves a wide discretion. But it is one that in practice is likely to result in a refusal to enforce.
FIDIC’s Silver Book – Payments due shall not be withheld … really?
There is a substantial difference between the payment provisions of the FIDIC 1999 Red and Yellow Books compared with the Silver Book. This article explores how a court in Queensland (Australia) has dealt with the Silver Book’s provision. Contractors have good cause to be wary.
FIDIC Guidance Memorandum – A Half Baked Solution?
This article discusses whether the recently issued FIDIC Guidance Memorandum really does provide the answer to the vexed question of enforcement of binding, but not yet final DAB decisions. On 1 April 2013 the FIDIC Contracts Committee issued a Guidance Memorandum to users which is intended to be used with the Conditions of Contract for Construction (the ‘Red Book’), the Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build (the ‘Yellow Book’), and the Conditions of Contract for EPC/Turnkey Projects (the ‘Silver Book’). The FIDIC Contracts Committee have stated that compliance with the guidance is highly recommended when using the 1999 FIDIC Red, Yellow or Silver Books. This article considers briefly whether the Guidance Memorandum is either necessary or useful.
S69- Of Chablis, Smoked Salmon and Trifles
In the first two months of 2013 twelve cases were reported that dealt with Arbitration Act 1996 (“AA”) issues. Of these twelve cases, a quarter involved applications for leave to appeal under s.69(3) AA 1996 and a further quarter dealt with applications under s.68 (serious irregularities). The statistics are not surprising. The AA 1996 has now been in force for a little over 16 years and a substantial body of case law exists. However, when a party loses a case it may feel that it has no option but to challenge the award. There are often commercial reasons for this and/or the unsuccessful party may also feel genuinely aggrieved by the award. The recent case law dealing with leave to appeal has, however, shown that challenging an award under s.69 AA 1996 is no easy option. This article considers the grounds on which leave to appeal an arbitrator’s award will be granted. The courts, when considering an application for leave to appeal, place high hurdles for any applicant to overcome. Leave to appeal under s.69(3) was not granted in any of the reported cases on Bailii up to 1 March 2013 this year. However, it is evident from the reported cases that some applications for leave to appeal are successful, especially where the issue relates to matters of general public importance: Dalmare SpA v Union Maritime Ltd & Anor.
Enforcement of Declarations and conflicting decisions: West Tankers still afloat
The case of West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA and Generali Assicurazione Generali SpA has once again come before the courts on the issue of enforcement. In 2009 the West Tankers case went before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) who held that an anti-suit injunction, issued by an English court to prevent court proceedings progressing in another Member State, was contrary to EC Regulation 44/2001 (the ‘Brussels I Regulation’). The consequence of that ruling is that West Tankers Inc now has an award in its favour in London but risks having a conflicting judgment in the Italian courts. This recent decision of the English High Court in West Tankers addresses how an arbitrator’s award can be protected in the absence of an anti-suit injunction. In this article we set out the facts relating to the West Tankers dispute and the court’s recent decision that, in certain circumstances, it will recognise an arbitrator’s award in declaratory terms. The court has taken a pragmatic rather than logical approach to the problem of conflicting decisions. However, the thorny question of ‘what happens when enforcement is sought of a conflicting regulation judgement where there is already an arbitration award?’ was side-stepped. The issue has been considered by the European Commission in a recent Proposal and by the European Scrutiny Committee of the UK Parliament, in which it expressed reservations regarding the approach proposed by the European Commission.
Contracts rights of third parties act – Arbitration under the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999 and Enforcement of an Award
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 has redressed many of the criticisms made against the English privity of contract rule. Regrettably, however, Parliament ignored the recommendations of the Law Commission and extended the application of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 to include arbitration. While this has little impact where a dispute is purely domestic it does have an impact where a dispute has an international character. It may surprise many foreign parties to contracts that are subject to the law of England and Wales that they have, by including reference to English law, potentially given rights to a third party. A third party who has obtained those rights will however find itself having an up-hill struggle to enforce an arbitration award that it might obtain in a foreign jurisdiction. This is because the third party is not a party to the arbitration agreement and the New York Convention applies only to parties to the arbitration agreement. There has not yet been a case on enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction of an award made under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 but as the Act is now being used more often this is an issue that may soon have to be addressed by the courts.
Incorporation of Arbitration Clauses Revisited
Eight years ago in an article in Arbitration we noted the divergent views of a number of first-instance judges on the subject of the incorporation of arbitration clauses. The key issue was whether an arbitration clause could be incorporated into a contract by general words or whether this required clear express words only. The question of whether an arbitration agreement is incorporated into a contract is fundamental as it determines whether the parties are required to proceed to resolve their dispute by arbitration rather than court proceedings. The starting point for any analysis is the wording of the Arbitration Act 1996 s.6. This states: “6. Definition of arbitration agreement (1) In this Part an ‘arbitration agreement’ means an agreement to submit to arbitration present or future disputes (whether they are contractual or not). (2) The reference in an agreement to a written form of arbitration clause or to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the reference is such as to make that clause part of the agreement.” The difficulty arises because of the final words in s.6(2): “if the reference is such as to make that clause part of the agreement”. There has been conflicting authority as to what is required to make “that clause part of the agreement”.
Commencement of Arbitration and Time Bar Clauses
This article considers how English courts construe time-bar clauses and whether there is an advantage in having an arbitration clause in a contract where there is a time-bar clause. It is now common to find time-bar provisions in many of the major forms of construction contracts. They appear in NEC 3, in the FIDIC suite of contracts and the ICE forms. Sub clause 20.1 of the FIDIC forms of contract, for example, creates a time-bar that gives a Contractor just a mere 28 days to put in a notice of a claim for additional cost or an extension of time. Given that the effect of a failure to issue a 28-day notice is an apparent bar on any claim, it is unsurprising that time-bar clauses have been the subject of much consideration and review. Recent decisions in the courts show that these clauses are being construed strictly. This has led one leading English lawyer, in a paper on the FIDIC forms of contract, to comment that quite possibly there are no ways round a sub-cl.20.1 notice.
FIDIC’s Clause 20 a Common Law View
‘No one can obtain an advantage by his own wrong.’ However, clause 20.1 of the FIDIC forms of contract appears to permit an employer to obtain an advantage where it has caused a delay and where the contractor has failed to give a notice in the 28 days specified. In such circumstance should a court or arbitrator uphold the notice provisions in the FIDIC contracts? This article considers what happens when a contractor fails to give a clause 20.1 notice with the result that the employer takes advantage of his or her own default. Under the FIDIC forms of contract, a contractor that wishes to make a claim for either time or additional money must give a notice in accordance with clause 20.1. Historically, courts and arbitrators in common law countries would hold the parties to their bargains whoever difficult or unconscionable the result might be. In recent years this position appears to be changing. The legislation in many common law countries imposes terms in contracts to protect consumers. In some jurisdictions, contacts may also be interpreted to avoid commercial absurdity, and in other jurisdictions the courts will strike down unconscionable bargains. There is also a doctrine, which is applied in many jurisdictions, that ‘No one can obtain an advantage by his own wrong’ (De Zotell v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 60 SD 532, 245. NW 58, 59). It is sometimes described as a ‘principle of equity’ and expressed in the maxims: ‘ex injuria non oritur jus’ or ‘the clean hands theory’.
